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In Brecht's play The Mother, which he based on Gorky's novel of the
same name, Vlassova the proletarian heroine of the story states that, if
the middle classes have no respect for, and no need of, their education,
then they would do well to hand it over to the underprivileged who
could certainly use it to their own advantage. Her sharp observation
on conspicuous waste might well serve as an epigram for Jacques
Delaruelle's critique in 'Aesthetics and Art Education' (Literature
and Aesthetics, October 1994) where he draws attention to the fact
that aesthetics is missing in the curricula of Colleges of Fine Arts and
similar institutions. Delaruelle remarks that in postgraduate seminars
the 'discussion of Plato's, Aristotle's, Aquinas', Kant's, Schelling's,
Hegel's, Nietzsche's and Heidegger's contribution to the understanding
of art seems, on the whole, barely acceptable as "cultural literacy"'.
Delaruelle may not be pleased to find himself in the company of
Brecht, Gorky and others cited below. However, they provide a relevant
subtext to his critique, not least because what can be inferred from its
details encompasses issues requiring closer attention.
Vlassova's declaration as to the value of an established, traditional,
or simply ruling-class education is based on the idea that such an
education is useful to those who have been deprived of it because, in
taking up the knowledge, know-how, truth, beauty and any other
absolute belonging to the canon created and disseminated by dominant
social groups-however narrowly conceived knowledge, beauty and
so on, may have been by the latter-they gain access to the organizing
institutions of society, which govern the lives of all men and women.
By means of their education the ruling classes have also set into place
the political mechanisms that keep a check on people and institutions
alike, and trace out their trajectory, present and future. Consequently,
being educated guarantees some degree of empowerment, including
intervention in politics. And education necessarily incorporates art
and culture, for to be educated, as those on top have continued to
indicate to those beneath them, is also to be cultivated. Its value,
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then, for the people on the bottom is its use-value, not as petty
pragmatism or even pettier opportunism, but as social purposefulness
and social action. The latter, in Vlassova's terms, is the means by
which the damned and the despised can pull themselves out of the
mud and acquire the status of human beings. The qualitative move,
then, which occurs when education and culture are possessed, is the
move from the most primitive form of existence to life. According to
Vlassova, the qualitative leap for persons is imbricated in a qualitative
change for society, persons and structures being part and parcel of
each other.
What we have here through Gorky via Brecht is close to Gramsci's
argument that bourgeois culture, far from being despised, should be
harnessed to the cause of large-scale social transformation since not
only does it provide the illiterate with the instruments for literacy, but
also encompasses everything that, conceptually as well as practically,
has made societies work for the benefit of those working them. The
appropriation of bourgeois culture entails nothing less than an entry
into the processes of making history, from which the culturally
expropriated had been excluded. As is well known, Gramsci does not
go into discussions about the ontological 'subject' : this he leaves
with Hegel and, as fate would have it, to Foucault, among other
critics of so-called humanist theories of consciousness, will, individual
autonomy and individual wholeness or coherence. Gramsci is
concerned with the sociopolitical agent of action through whose figure
he attempts to explain who pushes whom off the world stage and for
which reasons, the 'making of history' being synonymous not with
the 'telos' decried by Foucault (and Deleuze, and Derrida, and
Baudrillard, and countless epigones of these French stars) but with
what in our tepid, tired times would be called 'minority rights'.
Culture, for Gramsci, necessarily includes art culture whose aristocratic
and, subsequently, middle-class origins, he fully acknowledges; and
it includes the framework of reflection and assessment-aesthetics-
to which art is attached. The point is not to throw out aesthetics,
however debatable, in Gramsci' s view, its criteria of worthiness where
art works are concerned, or its criteria of taste where art admirers are
concerned, but to grasp, know, deal with and act upon the canon so
that its hegemonic rule cannot go unchallenged, nor its grip stifle any
alternative form of culture corning from the 'subaltern classes'.1
Of course, Gramsci enlisted all this in the struggle for socialism at
a time when the latter seemed the only alternative to fascism. And,
although it has become more than fashionable, since the collapse of
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Eastern Europe, to debunk socialism-indeed more fashionable than
extolling the virtues of liberal democracy, notwithstanding Fukuyama's
big bid for the limelight-Gramsci's analysis is hardly obsolete for a
period-ours-that, on the one hand, denigrates classical learning
(canonical, 'repressive', 'dead white male', and so on, depending on
the interest group speaking) and, on the other, erects an 'alternative'
program in the manner of positive discrimination.2 Meanwhile,
somewhere else again, is set up a seemingly value-free, merely
utilitarian 'information bank' that is supposedly accessible to all
(hence, is supposedly democratic), but that, in reality, favours those
who know how to manipulate the 'bank' best. The 'bank' thus serves
the interests of those-in-the-know who, in addition, deride non-
utilitarian, 'useless' knowledge, a category to which aesthetics would
perforce belong. In short, the battle of interest groups today continues
the war that Gramsci saw being waged on the larger scale still of
historical, class struggle and ideological legitimacy and legitimation.
What constitutes 'cultural literacy' is much more, as Dclaruelle
must understand perfectly well, than a matter of content, of, say,
Kant rather than Germaine Greer or Camille Paglia in the modern
curriculum. The debates of the nineteen twenties and thirties were
partisan. this showing only too clearly how much was at stake, whether
it involved the preservation of social structures and their elites, or the
ideal of a people's state and the abolition of elites. It took a Pierre
Bourdieu to insist once again, albeit some forty years later and, this
time, from a non-militant, although not depoliticized point of view,
on how education, art and culture were embroiled in social struggle.
He also gave older debates a new twist by focusing on how the
privileged enclaves of society produce, define and reproduce 'cultural
literacy', which ensures their place in the social hierarchy and confers
symbolic power upon them. These privileged enclaves are not,
Bourdieu argues, privileged in the same way. Groups that wield
economic power, for instance, may well acquire a social standing
commensurate with their wealth, but they may not have the requisite
'cultural capital' to give them cultural supremacy, whether material
or symbolic. 'Cultural capital' may be defined briefly here as the
requisite storehouse oflearning (literary. painterly, theatrical, musical,
and so on), of attitude and approach, and of impeccable judgement
and taste (judgement and taste being set by whichever elites reign in
a given time-frame or period). By the same token, groups that have
accumulated intellectual and cultural 'goods' (Bourdieu's term) may
have neither economic back-up, nor social status or, for that matter,
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any political clout to speak of. These groups are effectively powerless
in any concrete sense of the word. Nevertheless, they may exercise
symbolic power over those who have little cultural capital or none at
all and, in this way maintain, however precariously, their claim to
distinction. In short, cultural elites may not be elites in any other
form (that is, not economic, nor political, and so on).3 By way of a
parenthesis, it is worth noting the-piquant-relevance of Bourdieu's
analysis for the present situation of academics whose hold on the last
vestiges of symbolic power left to them by an overriding power
structure is so precarious that they risk losing it altogether.
The upshot of Bourdieu's argument is like Zeno's paradox of the
hare and the tortoise: access to culture is unequal and is bound to stay
unequal, since a start from a disadvantaged position entails being
disadvantaged forever. Thus, irrespective of exceptions that confirm
the rule, the children of working-class parents will never quite catch
up with their middle-class peers. They will never quite acquire the
amount, range and kind of knowledge had by children to whom the
world of learning and of the arts is available from an early age in the
household. Nor will they be able to assume the manner, tone and
style through which their familiarity with culture is communicated by
those born to it. Moreover, they are denied the kind of ease that
comes from a family history of 'cultural literacy', when cultivated
generations succeed cultivating ones. The channels of transmission
from grandparents to parents to children are integral to the reproduction
of social classes. Each goes to its own, whether at the top or the
bottom of the social hierarchy. Reproduction at the top follows the
principle that nothing succeeds like success. Reproduction at the
bottom ensures the survival of ways of life enjoyed by the lower
classes, but whose culture is spumed by their superiors in the name of
the latters' 'distinguished' culture.4
It must not be forgotten that, according to Bourdieu, the top is not
a homogeneous ensemble. Multiple, different elites coexist, but do
not necessarily coincide: economic elites may be cultural underlings,
as was indicated above. Although none of them can have it all, all the
time, the chances are, Bourdieu argues, that people who are well-off
can buy the culture that is defined by their cultural superiors as the
right one. Having bought it, they close ranks. Put differently, this
means that, for all their differences in kind, elites protect themselves.
Identification of self through a corporate body, in this case, the elite,
is fundamental to the processes of reproduction. In the context of
these ideas, it is not difficult to see how the disappearance of aesthetics
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from the pedagogical scene, as referred to by Delaruelle, may be a
way of belittling 'distinguished' culture, of settling scores with
superiors of the past and with anyone, in the present, on whom
difference and real distinction could be conferred. The motives,
however, for this possible 'revenge' has precious little in common
with Bourdieu's humanistic defence of the people who have benefited
least from the best-in terms of 'literacy', art, economic security and
any other terms.
Bourdieu, specifically on aesthetics, maintains that qualities
thought to be intrinsic to art are, in fact, socially generated, as are
matters of taste. Taste is not determined by the nobility of an art work
but by groups who impose their taste on others through a network of
activities that channel values, beliefs and sensibilities. The notion of
imposition evoked here has nothing to do with conspiracy theories,
nor even with theories of submission and control, as best exemplified
by Foucault.5 It has to do, firstly, with Bourdieu's premise that nothing
can happen outside society, which is why art cannot be 'pure' nor
taste an expression of some inner propensity for what is good, beautiful
and true. His theory that perception, reception and appreciation are
socially constructed provides the nuts and bolts of Bourdieu' s critique
of Kant, and especially of Kant's propositions regarding the 'inherent'
sense of beauty in those endowed with 'taste'.6 Secondly, Bourdieu's
argument that taste is not given but imposed-so, consequently, are
judgements as to the value, quality and importance of this rather than
that piece of art-is intimately bound up, on the one hand, with what
he describes as 'positions and dispositions' and, on the other, as
'fields'. 'Positions and dispositions' refers to the social space occupied
by any particular group (for which, Bourdieu believes, such terms as
'upper-class' or 'lower-class' are inadequate given the complexity of
social stratification in the modern world). It refers, as well, to the
approach, and mental and emotional outlook and openness fostered
within that social space and which is peculiar to it. 'Fields' refers to
the organizational infrastructure through which art works are
distributed, supported, appreciated ( by critics, other specialists, and
the public) and in which they are bought and sold. What I have
termed 'organizational infrastructure' would refer, in the case of the
visual arts, to the galleries, museums, art journals, art societies,
competitions, prizes, advertising, and the like, which propagate certain
works (and ignore others) and, by doing so, construct a whole system
of evaluation that implicates works and audiences in one fell swoop.
Qualities are ascribed to works. Taste is established.?
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It is in this framework that Delaruelle's remarks on the confusion
in education as to what constitutes 'art' may be usefully placed. This
confusion, he implies, reflects the predominant position today among
artists, namely, that anyone can be an artist and anything can be art.
(One could, in fact, argue that this apparently democratic laissezfaire
in which artists and educationists-not to mention the art network as
a whole-seem to be in collusion is actually the expression of a
fierce struggle for self-assertion: a defiant 'I am as good as anyone'
that comes from a refusal to recognize authority or even mere
superiority to oneself; a rejection of hierarchies that distinguish
between 'masters'and 'masterworks' and 'secondary' or 'minor' artists
and art.) What I am suggesting is that Bourdicu can help to eludicidate
this state of affairs because it is a walking, talking parody, a crude
travesty, of his critique of how and why claims to artistic and
intellectual supremacy are established and what pressures they exert
socially even when they appear to be confined to the 'disinterested'
realm, the special domain, of the imagination and ideas. In other
words, what in Bourdieu is an intricate argument about the numerous
interactions taking place in any society at anyone time-art being
part and parcel of them-becomes, in the 'cool' -some call it
postmodernist-sphere of contemporary practices in art and education
the equivalent of icon-bashing and sui gelleris justification.
None of this means that Bourdieu can be blamed for the current
dismissal of classical/hierarchical/elitist learning. art and culture.
Bourdieu, it is worth repeating, is iconoclastic only insofar as
he defends the principle that 'everything is social':8 nothing is of
itself alone. Consequently, the icons he attacks are socially. that is,
collectively defined They are not the private fantasies of one
individual. For these reasons, he would consider Thierry de Duve's
theory, which Delaruelle paraphrases as 'art is all that which I name
art', to be nothing other than a go-getting subjectivism that simply
cannot deal with the interface between subjective perception and
objective phenomena. Mere seeing, or saying, docs not, in Bourdieu,
make it so. In addition, mere naming is a far cry from the practice
that is art. Delaruelle speaks of the 'disastrous trend' in current art
education. Arguably, this trend points to the emergence of new groups,
in universities and colleges across the board, who, under the guise of
'pure' individualism and/or anti~litism, are actually striving to become
new clites. As such, they are caught up in the pursuit of symbolic
power without realizing, yet, that it is illusory and a mere simulacrum
of the real power that is being exercised by someone else. This
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'someone else'-these others-are neither artists nor academics.
Among them, however, is one new elite, a managerial caste that has
sliced itself away from its academic origins, but which still pretends
to have academic status, knowing full well, just the same, that this
status is a sham. Furthermore, secure in its perfidious knowledge, the
parvenu caste can exploit even better a lamentable situation for its
own personal gain. As if this were not enough, it still presumes to
judge, on so-called 'academic' grounds, those who, in fair play,
would be its peers. Roll over Plato and tutti quanti : since this is no
place for peers, it will not hold superiors. But who will be the judge
of the legitimacy of the judges?9 So much for the kiIling of learned
culture.
Notes
See, in particular, Letteratura e vita nazionale, Rome, 1979 and Antonio Gramsci,
Selections from Cultural Writings, ed. David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-
Smith, trans. William Boelhower, Cambridge, Mass., 1985. For an illuminating
commentary on Gramsci' s ideas about the various forms of culture that can make
up a national culture, without the laller's being the culture of an elite, see Robert
S. Dombroski, Antonio Gramsci, Boston, 1989, esp. pp.74-121.
2 I am, of course, referring to Francis Fukuyama's The Erui ofHistory and lhe Last
Man, New York, 1993.
3 Bourdieu's argument on the formation of elites runs right through his writings,
but is possibly most trenchantly expressed along the lines I have suggested here
in his La Distinction: Critique sociale du jugement, Paris, 1979 (Distinction: A
Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice, Cambridge,
Mass., 1984) and Choses diles, Paris, 1987.
4 For the arguments relevant to the above points on cultural heritage and social
reproduction see Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, Les Hhitiers, Paris,
1964 and La Reproduction, Paris, 1970 (in English as Reproduction in Education,
Society and Culture, London, 1990).
5 The canonical text on the subject is his Surveil/er et punir. La Naissance de la
prison, Paris, 1975. (In English as Discipline and Punish: The Birth ofthe Prison,
trans. Alan Sheridan, London, 1977.) Instructive also are the interviews with
Foucault in PowerlKnowledge: Selected Interviews arui Other Writings, 1972-
1977, ed. Colin Gordon, New York, 1980, pp.l09-165.
6 La Distinction, pp.543-585. For a critique of Bourdieu on Kant and an
argument against Bourdieu from the French intellectual perspective in which
be, notwithstanding Bourdieu's international horizons and international acclaim
is to be viewed, see Bruno Pequignot, Pour une sociologie esthlthique, Paris,
1993, pp.169-183. Pequignot describes Bourdieu's criticism of Kant as a
'misunderstanding' and attempts to explain (not altogether successfully) how it
is possible to combine aesthetics and sociology, that is, speak of the qualities of
a work of art and thus give them their particular status as belonging to art and
nothing else and, at the same time, take into consideration their social genesis
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and impact, as well as how they are constituted through the minds of their-
socially-formed-beholders. Bourdieu aims for nothing less than a complete
understanding of how what is proper to art (this including issues of form. genre.
style, technique, execution) and to the apperceptions and emotions it inspires is
produced in a specific work or professional context in a specific social context
and within the restraints. historical and geographical, pertinent to this double
context. Pequignot tends to reduce Bourdieu's argument. which does not always
explain absolutely clearly the articulation between art and society and aesthetics
and sociology. to a matter of the social conditions of the reception of art pure
and simple. In doing so. he returns to the question raised with such brio in the
1960s and 70s. and which became the special provenance of French structuralists
(rewriting the Russian Formalists), on the specificity of art.
7 These concepts appear consistently throughOiJt Bourdieu 's work. A fairly succinct
account of them specifically in relation to art works is to be found in Les Regles
de I'art: Genese et structure du champ litteraire. Paris. 1992, pp.356-371. lbis
book and the essays published in English as The Field of Cultural Production:
Essays on Art and Literature. ed. and introduced by Randal Johnson, 1993 give a
good idea of how Bourdieu's theses on art and literature fit into his work as a
whole.
8 Bourdieu's exasperated exclamation in an interview, on the publication of Les
Regles de I'art. in reply to the journalist's question whether he, Bourdieu, had
reduced art to the 'merely' social. See Magazine litteraire. October 1992, p.llO.
9 This theme. which is here put in the fonn of a question, pervades Bourdieu's
Homo academicus. Paris, 1984.
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